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n 1986, Maxicare Health Plans, with over two million members in twenty-six states, was touted as the best-managed health maintenance organization (HMO) in the industry. Within three years, its founder had resigned, it had filed for bankruptcy protection, and it had been placed on a list of the ten most poorly managed companies in the United States, as compiled by Financial World, a financial management magazine. 1 Because Maxicare operated in twenty-six states, its bankruptcy had widespread repercussions. It dispelled the myth that HMO failure was restricted to new HMOs with few enrollees. Combined with other HMO failures in the late 1980s, it has motivated state policymakers, in particular, to reexamine the adequacy of their statutes and administrative rules relating to HMO formation, financial performance, and enrollee protection. 2 In this paper, we present data on trends in HMO failures over time, the characteristics of plans that fail, and the attempts by states to address the adverse consequences of HMO failures. We also discuss the complex and often competing interests that must be balanced in these policy responses.
Anatomy Of An HMO Failure
As with any business, the failure of an HMO is a process that occurs over a period of time, rather than a discrete event marked by the filing of a bankruptcy petition. While this process varies somewhat from case to case, it appears to follow a fairly consistent chronological pattern. Typically, the HMO exhibits a tendency over time to underestimate its incurred but not reported claims or overestimate its receivables. As it finds its revenues falling behind its outlays each month, its first response is often to subsidize this shortfall by drawing down its reserves, which were established through initial capitalization of the plan or through surpluses generated from previous operations. If no reserves exist, or if they have been exhausted, the plan may borrow against a line of credit under the assumption that the shortfall is temporary. At the same time, the HMO may take administrative steps designed to improve its short-run cash flow, to "buy time" to renegotiate contracts with providers, tighten its utilization review system, and/ or drop unprofitable group contracts. These steps could include billing employers earlier for the next month's premiums or delaying payments to providers. To hide its deteriorating financial position from regulators, investors, and contracting providers, the HMO may change the accounting procedures it uses in its financial statements.
The HMO's financial problems often become public as a result of complaints from contracting providers about delayed payments for services rendered. A somewhat stronger signal is sent to the public when an excessive number of providers begin to terminate their HMO contracts because of delayed payments, the introduction of more stringent utilization review procedures, or increased risk sharing. An individual practice association (IPA)-model plan, for instance, may choose not to return the provider "withhold" pool, or it may seek to place providers at greater financial risk for costs associated with their referrals. Provider dissatisfaction and a shrinking delivery system then cause some employers to discontinue offering the HMO to their employees. Obviously, this exacerbates the HMO's short-run cash flow problems, even if these groups were previously unprofitable for the HMO.
The role of state regulators. At some point in this scenario, the HMO comes under the scrutiny of state HMO regulators. If an HMO failure appears to be highly probable, and state statutes allow, state regulators may assume management of the HMO and require the hiring of an external management team to "rehabilitate" the plan. The goal of rehabilitation is to maintain a viable delivery system and relationships with employers while the HMO is restructured or a buyer is found. If this proves impossible, the HMO moves into liquidation. The duties of the management team then shift to administering the dissolution of the HMO so that enrollees remain covered as they are shifted to new plans and providers' claims are paid to the greatest extent possible. Typically, at this point (or earlier), the HMO's reinsurer becomes involved in the process.
Insolvency insurance. Most HMOs have insolvency insurance coverage, with such coverage required in many states. The purpose of insolvency coverage is to pay providers' claims and thus ensure continuous access to services for enrollees until they can obtain alternative coverage. However, insolvency insurance typically pays only for those services received between the time that the plan is declared insolvent and the end of the period for which insolvency premiums are paid. (Usually, this is the end of the month; the insolvency insurer also pays all claims of hospitalized enrollees until their discharge.) Its purpose is not to ensure payment to providers for services delivered before the HMO became insolvent. Another important feature of insolvency policies is that the carrier must provide enrollees with a "transition" insurance option, subject to benefits and terms previously filed with the state. Usually, the enrollee has thirty days to exercise this option, with the resulting coverage lasting from six to eighteen months.
Naturally, the specific date of insolvency is of critical concern to all parties. This date is often determined through a court decision and may not be official until after the HMO has ceased to function. Any delay in this decision increases the likelihood that enrollees will have found alternative coverage, thereby reducing the carrier's potential liability.
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However, delays expose contracting (and noncontracting) providers to a greater risk of not receiving full payment for services rendered.
The case of Maxicare. Managing an HMO insolvency often is complicated by ambiguity regarding the appropriate roles of state regulatory agencies and federal courts. This was a major issue in Maxicare's bankruptcy proceeding. Maxicare filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Codes, which specifically excludes insurers from its bankruptcy provisions, leaving their liquidation and rehabilitation to be carried out by the office of the state insurance commissioner. 3 Maxicare argued that HMOs are different than health insurers and that blanket protection under federal bankruptcy laws would provide it with the best opportunity to reorganize, given the multistate nature of its operations.
According to some reports, Maxicare owed providers approximately $330 million at the time of its filing. 4 The requests of providers receive no higher priority under bankruptcy laws than do the requests of other creditors. They might be viewed more favorably under a state-managed rehabilitation or liquidation procedure in which greater emphasis might be placed on providing continuous care to enrollees. However, even in these procedures, providers are not likely to fare as well as enrollees. As the president of the National Association of HMO Regulators (NAH-MOR) has observed, "State insurance departments don't exist to protect doctors. They exist to protect enrollees." 5 Were a liquidation of an HMO's assets to occur, the first creditor to be paid would be the state government, for the costs of management during the liquidation and rehabilitation period, followed by HMO employees, for any wages owed. Patients would be reimbursed next, followed by other creditors such as physicians and hospitals, if any funds remained. Many states have legislated "holdharmless" provisions that preclude providers from billing patients directly in the event of an HMO failure. As a result, providers tend to bear a substantial financial risk in the event of an HMO insolvency.
The Maxicare bankruptcy petition provoked a strong negative response from states that had statutes providing for the rehabilitation of insurance companies. Several of these states (such as Texas, Louisiana, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio) filed lawsuits asking that Maxicare plans in their jurisdictions be excluded from the federal bankruptcy action. Their petitions were denied, in part on the grounds that an HMO is not equivalent to a health insurance company and that Congress could have explicitly excluded HMOs from federal bankruptcy jurisdiction had it wished to do so. Thus, the petitioning states found that they could not apply their established rehabilitation and liquidation procedures to a failed HMO, at least in this case.
Although Maxicare was allowed to seek protection under federal 6 It is not clear whether operating in multiple states is, in fact, a germane distinction. A bankruptcy judge ruled that the failure of Beacon Health in New Hampshire came under state regulatory jurisdiction rather than federal bankruptcy courts. 7 The judge pointed out that national insurance companies' failures are handled at the state level, even though their failures have impacts across states.
State versus federal jurisdiction. Patrick Cantilo offers six reasons why HMO failure should be under the jurisdiction of state regulators rather than federal bankruptcy courts. 8 Central to his argument is the fact that enrollees and providers are treated differently under the two approaches: enrollees are given priority under state regulation but are treated as equal to providers in federal bankruptcy courts. First, Cantilo argues that enrollees should receive greater protection than providers, because enrollees have less choice than providers when entering into a contract with the HMO. Most enrollees choose from a limited set of alternatives provided by their employer and cannot bargain about the specific characteristics of the coverage. Providers, on the other hand, have much more latitude in bargaining. Second, if HMO failures are under the jurisdiction of federal bankruptcy courts while other forms of health insurance failures are managed by the state, HMOs will be at a competitive disadvantage. Enrollees will be more likely to choose the health insurance system that protects them in the case of failure.
Third, HMOs under federal bankruptcy jurisdiction are often not declared insolvent. This declaration is necessary for state guaranty funds to be used to protect HMO enrollees. Fourth, placing HMOs under federal bankruptcy jurisdiction makes it more difficult to use other aspects of the state HMO regulatory structure. In particular, it might make protecting an enrollee's continuity of coverage more difficult by blocking access to replacement coverage, including the transfer to more successful HMOs in the area. Fifth, federal bankruptcy protection undermines effective HMO regulation in states where HMOs are required to maintain adequate reserves. In these states, the failure of a national firm could allow these reserves to be transferred to the national firm's HMOs located in another state. This penalizes effective state regulation. Finally, placing an HMO under federal bankruptcy jurisdiction could block the ability of state regulators to replace ineffective management with experts in dealing with troubled HMOs. 
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Historical Frequency Of HMO Failures
If HMOs fail infrequently, regulators may be able to address their consequences case by case. On the other hand, if HMO failures are relatively common events and impose substantial costs on the parties involved, more aggressive public policies may be justified. Thus, for informed policy making, it is necessary to establish the frequency of HMO failures and the types of HMOs that are likely to fail.
Sources of data. Reports of state regulators are one source of information about HMO failures. In 1988, state HMO regulators were surveyed to collect data to be used in crafting amendments to state HMO legislation. The survey, precipitated by the Maxicare bankruptcy, elicited responses from thirty-five states containing 92 percent of operational HMOs. It found only twelve states reporting HMO insolvencies (or "financial impairments") between 1982 and 1988. 9 In total, respondents identified twenty-one HMO insolvencies, including three HMOs that ceased operations before enrolling any members. Almost all of these insolvent HMOs had adequate enrollee protection through insolvency insurance and "hold-harmless" contractual clauses that prohibited providers affiliated with the HMOs from billing enrollees directly for payment of services. Therefore, the researchers concluded that "regulators' concern that many existing HMOs have a considerable likelihood of becoming insolvent and jeopardizing enrollee medical care and financial circumstances is not supported by this survey." 10 This conclusion must be tempered by the nature of the survey, which focused on insolvencies and relied on regulators' recall over a seven-year period. HMOs may fail without becoming insolvent and still impose costs on involved parties. Also, substantial turnover among HMO regulators may have led to an underestimate of HMO failures.
The National HMO Census provides an alternative data source on HMO failures. As part of a larger study of organizational development within the HMO industry, we compiled National HMO Census data for the years [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . From the census, it is possible to obtain for all HMOs the HMO's name, headquarters location, federal qualification status, the year founded, total enrollment in each year it was observed, and organizational form (staff, group, network, or IPA). supplied by Blue Cross and Blue Shield, permitted the identification of HMO mergers, acquisitions, and affiliations with national firms. We assumed that an HMO failed if it was not listed in the census after a specific year, after having been listed in previous years, and if it could not be identified as having merged with or been acquired by another HMO." This process results in more HMO "failures" than identification of technically insolvent HMOs, since factors other than bankruptcy or financial insolvency can cause an existing HMO to close its doors. For instance, HMOs that foresee serious financial problems may terminate operations, even though they technically may not be insolvent.
Using
While they provide a useful overall picture of the industry, these data are likely to underestimate the number of HMO failures that occur, since the observed change from year to year is the net result of HMO foundings and failures. Exhibit 2 presents data that are more directly relevant to HMO failures. Prior to 1986, the numbers of both failures and mergers Therefore, it appears that HMOs affiliated with national firms did not bear a disproportionate share of failures and mergers during the 1980s, as compared with local HMOs. This may be because many national HMO firms are owned by large insurers and thus have access to external sources of financial support during negative years. Exhibit 5 also indicates a relatively low failure/ merger rate among Blue Cross/ Blue Shield plans. A second issue of interest is whether market characteristics affect failures. In an analysis of HMO entries and exits, we found that larger metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) were more likely to experience both HMO entries and exits. 12 This was also the case for MSAs that were growing more rapidly and MSAs with more large employers per capita. Presumably, the larger number of HMOs entering these communities stimulates more intense competition, which in turn leads to a greater number of subsequent failures or mergers. HMOs are less likely to enter communities with large physician-to-population ratios, but once they enter such communities, they are less likely to fail. HMOs are also less likely to fail in communities where a relatively large proportion of the population is enrolled in HMOs. This effect, which is independent of the length of time HMOs have been operating in an MSA, suggests that fewer exits occur in well-developed markets. The probability of HMO failure is lower in areas with relatively high per capita incomes. The level of community hospital expenditures per capita is not related to the probability of HMO exit, but high levels of expenditure are associated with a greater probability of entry. Market age (measured from the year the first HMO appeared) and HMO enrollment concentration (as measured by an enrollment-based Herfindahl index) have no effect on HMO failure.
Evolution Of State Regulation
The federal government regulates HMOs through the HMO Act of 1973 and its subsequent amendments and through its Medicare program. The HMO Act defines the standards that HMOs must meet to become federally qualified, but a substantial portion of the industry (42 percent) was not federally qualified in 1989. Furthermore, amendments to the HMO Act generally have eliminated or weakened its regulatory provisions, while federal budgetary limitations have reduced oversight activities. At the same time, however, the states have assumed broader responsibilities in HMO regulation. This transformation was facilitated by NAHMOR, which developed model state HMO regulations in collaboration with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 13 Although not all recent state regulatory initiatives have been motivated by increases in HMO failures and mergers, the financial position of HMOs clearly has been of concern to state regulators.
14 In addition to the increased number of failures in the late 1980s, a recent study reported that only 33 percent of HMOs were profitable in 1988 and that newer IPA-model HMOs were the least likely to be profitable. 15 In addition, even well-established HMOs experienced substantial financial difficulties; 46 percent of HMOs founded prior to 1980 were unprofitable in 1988. Reports such as this have heightened concern among state regulators that the "shakeout" of the HMO industry could continue.
Based on data collected by Aspen Systems Corporation, the number of states with explicit state HMO legislation increased from thirty-three in 1974 to forty-six in 1990. 16 In Exhibit 6, state regulatory initiatives that relate to, and presumably were motivated in part by, HMO failures and deterioration in the financial performance of operating HMOs are classified under three headings: entry regulations, oversight regulations, and regulations aimed at addressing the consequences of HMO failures.
Entry regulations. The general category of entry regulations includes provisions relating to HMO capital requirements, deposit or revenue requirements, compliance with state certificate-of-need legislation, and rules governing entry of an HMO based in another state. The purpose of entry regulations is presumably to increase the probability that new HMOs have sufficient initial capital and, in the case of certificate-of-need requirements, will be able to attract enough enrollees to be financially viable. If successful, these regulations would discourage the entry of undercapitalized HMOs with a relatively high probability of failing.
There is considerable variation across states in the exact nature of HMO reserve, capital, and deposit requirements. Exhibit 6 indicates that the number of states with some of these requirements has increased steadily since 1982. For instance, the number of states with specific reserve requirements has increased from twenty-seven to forty-four. The number of states with working capital requirements also has grown, although thirty-five states already had requirements of this sort in 1982.
The number of states requiring certificate-of-need review for HMOs actually declined from 1982 to 1989, paralleling a general decline in the popularity of certificate of need for hospitals during the same time period. Oversight regulations. Regulations relating to the oversight of HMOs address approval of HMO rates, on-site inspections of the financial accounts and records of HMOs and their contracting providers, the submission of annual reports detailing HMOs' financial condition, and the filing of notice of major changes in HMO delivery systems. The stated intent of these regulatory oversight provisions is to provide state authorities with ongoing information concerning the viability of the HMO. Taken together, these provisions form a kind of "early warning system" for the identification of HMOs with a relatively high probability of failure, so that regulators can help such HMOs remain solvent. 17 The requirement that HMOs submit their rates annually for review and approval is the most common (forty-one states) of these oversight regulations, but the number of states with this requirement has grown only modestly since 1982. There has been more rapid growth in the number of states requiring HMOs to submit notification and/ or obtain approval of changes in both contracts and ownership interest, with over half of states now reporting such requirements. The number of states requiring that HMOs submit annual reports has also increased by about 50 percent (to thirty-seven states) since 1982.
Protection against adverse consequences. The third category is made up of a mixture of regulations intended to protect specific stakeholders from the adverse consequences of an HMO failure. For instance, thirtythree states now have "hold-harmless" regulations that apply to HMO providers, an increase from seven states in 1982. These regulations protect HMO enrollees because they prohibit participating providers from billing enrollees for services rendered, in the event of nonpayment by the HMO. Other states require HMOs to file insolvency contingency plans that describe an orderly process for settling claims and providing services during an insolvency period. Forty states have legislation that requires HMOs to be regulated as insurers in the case of dissolution. Presumably, as discussed earlier, this would increase the probability that enrollees would continue to receive care during insolvency proceedings and that providers would receive at least partial payment.
Discussion
The increase in the proportion of states that have enacted laws and regulations relating to HMO failures appears to parallel the longitudinal pattern of merger and failure in the HMO industry. While one would expect a relationship between the two, the exact nature of that relationship appears to be complex. Theories of regulatory behavior suggest that regulations are often enacted in response to perceived shortcomings in the regulated industry. Typically, a "crisis" in industry performance is offered as justification for more intensive regulation. Well-publicized HMO failures in the late 1980s created a climate that supported increased HMO regulation by the states.
States that have a relatively large proportion of their residents enrolled in HMOs also appear, at least anecdotally, to have adopted relatively aggressive regulatory postures toward HMO failures. For instance, California has regulations relating to HMO reserve requirements that vary with the nature of the risk sharing between HMOs and their providers. Under its approach, "the more that plans contract or conduct business on a fee-for-service basis, the higher the reserve requirements." 18 Also, California has implemented a sophisticated system of financial surveillance to detect potential HMO insolvencies. Minnesota also strengthened its existing reserve requirements for HMOs in the late 1980s and established a Commission on Health Plan Regulatory Reform to reevaluate its state HMO regulatory framework. 19 While "public interest" justifications clearly can be offered for the adoption of regulations relating to HMO failures and their consequences, these regulations serve more narrowly defined economic interests as well. For example, in a "public interest" model of regulatory behavior, entry regulations represent a "preventive" approach for addressing the problems created by HMO failures. However, by raising the costs of entry into the marketplace, the regulations also could be construed as protecting existing HMOs from new competitors. Similarly, oversight regulations may be seen as serving the "public interest" if they help regulators to identify potential insolvencies in time to prevent them from occurring, thereby protecting consumers and creditors from the fallout of HMO failure. However, their increased popularity is also consistent with a "budgetmaximizing" theory of regulatory behavior, since they are likely to be associated with demands for greater funding and more staff on the part of regulatory agencies. Also, specific groups benefit from regulations that address the consequences of HMO failure. For instance, enrollees may benefit from regulations that give states greater powers to manage the dissolution of insolvent HMOs.
Given the variety of interests that arguably are served by expanded regulatory powers relating to HMO failures, it is not surprising that such regulation has become more commonplace. Nevertheless, both direct and indirect costs are likely to follow. These costs are sometimes difficult to quantify because it is impossible to know exactly what would have happened without regulation. For instance, if regulation restricts entry, will there be less competition and higher HMO premiums than without the regulation? If so, then regulations relating to HMO failures could indirectly impose significant costs on enrollees and employers. Similarly, if entry regulations impose higher costs on some types of HMOs than others, thereby discouraging their formation, what is the cost of the reduced range of choice available to consumers? Or, if HMOs are forced to raise premiums to meet higher reserve requirements, does the increased "security" adequately compensate consumers for their higher payments?
At present, adequate information to address such issues is not available. To formulate appropriate regulatory policy, it is important, at a minimum, to learn whether the regulations implemented in the past that pertain to HMO failures have achieved their stated purposes. If they are found to have measurable effects, then the costs and benefits that follow need to be estimated to determine if existing regulatory policies toward HMO failures should be supported, modified, or abandoned. We are currently pursuing research that addresses this question.
